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MY ACHING HEART
JamesA. Gardner*
It is often said that every happy family is happy in the same way,
but every unhappy family is miserable in a way all its own. So it is
with state constitutional decisions. The good decisions are good in
the same way-thoughtful, well-crafted, thorough, plausible-but the
bad ones stink uniquely. This makes it much more feasible to
nominate a worst decision than a best one.
But what are the criteria? There are so many ways in which a
decision can be lousy. What I would look for in a worst decision is
not merely poor judicial craft; anybody can write a lazy, sloppy
opinion. No, what I want is pathos, irony-a decision that lifts you
up and reveals new vistas... only to cruelly dash your naive hopes.
What I would look for is a decision in which a state court recognizes
its independence and then uses that independence for some dissolute
purpose; an opinion that turns to the state constitution with the
promise of liberation only to employ the document for purposes of
enslavement.
If those are the criteria, my nominee is People v. Ohrenstein.' In
Ohrenstein, the minority leader of the New York Senate was
prosecuted for theft of state property for using public funds to hire
aides whose principal duties consisted of working on the reelection
campaigns of Senate Democrats. In a state in which, during the last
decade, more members of the legislature have been indicted than
defeated for reelection, the significance of this prosecution cannot be
overstated. It promised New Yorkers the beginning of a cleansing;
perhaps-dared we hope?-the first step toward genuinely responsive, democratic self-rule.
In an opinion of epic blindness, the New York Court of Appeals
dismissed virtually all counts. Although the court's holding
concerned the proper interpretation of New York's criminal statutes,
its opinion was based fundamentally on an interpretation of the
state constitution according to which the legislature may insulate its
own crimes against the people of the state merely by statutorily
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authorizing them. In the court's view there was apparently no
pillaging of the public fisc, nor any offense against democratic selfgovernment itself, that the legislature might not exercise its
inherent powers to accomplish. The result of this decision is that
the only avenue to reform in New York is for the legislature itself to
mend its ways. All the rest of us have to do is sit tight and wait for
the legislature voluntarily to relinquish the means to perpetuate its
own members in power.
At its best, the New Judicial Federalism has shown that judicially
enforceable state constitutions really can be effective defenses
against the usurpation of governmental power by a self-perpetuating, undemocratic, unresponsive legislature.
Just not in New York.

